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The brain did not develop a dedicated device for reasoning. This fact bears dramatic consequences. While for 
perceptuo-motor functions neural activity is shaped by the input’s statistical properties, and processing is carried 
out at high speed in hardwired spatially segregated modules, in reasoning, neural activity is driven by internal 
dynamics, and processing times, stages, and functional brain geometry are largely unconstrained a priori. Here, it is 
shown that the complex properties of spontaneous activity, which can be ignored in a short-lived event-related 
world, become prominent at the long time scales of certain forms of reasoning which stretch over sufficiently long 
periods of time. It is argued that the neural correlates of reasoning  should in fact be defined in terms of non-trivial 
generic properties of spontaneous brain activity, and that this implies resorting to concepts, analytical tools, and 
ways of designing experiments that are as yet non-standard in cognitive neuroscience. The implications in terms of 
models of brain activity, shape of the  neural correlates, methods of data analysis, observability of the phenomenon 
and experimental designs are discussed. 
Keywords: cognitive neuroscience, reasoning, scaling, non-stationarity, non-ergodicity, characteristic scales, 
observation time, resting brain activity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider an individual trying to solve a problem, and 
reasoning for ten minutes before attaining a solution. 
Take the middle five minutes. Clearly, though containing 
no behaviourally salient event, these five minutes 
represent a genuine, indeed rather general, instance of 
reasoning. What do we know about the brain regime far 
from its conclusion? Can we use this regime to predict a 
solution, and a solution to retrodict this regime?  
Here, I concentrate on a form of reasoning, of which 
the above scenario constitutes an example, which can 
broadly be defined as "thinking in which there is a 
conscious intent to reach a conclusion and in which 
methods are used that are logically justified" [1], with no 
a priori assumption on the type of reasoning process that 
may take place during it. It is argued that finding the 
generic properties of this form of reasoning entails 
addressing the following fundamental issues: What are 
reasoning's temporal and spatial scales? When is a given 
observation time sufficient? How should we integrate the 
information contained in various reasoning episodes?  
A MINI LITERATURE REVIEW 
The neural correlates of reasoning have traditionally been 
expressed in terms of brain spatial coordinates. Early 
neuropsychological work viewed reasoning as emerging 
from global brain processing [2], consistent with 
evidence  indicating that it is negatively affected by diffuse 
brain damage [3]. Neuroimaging  studies have framed the 
neural correlates of reasoning in terms of local 
functionally specialized brain activity, either by taking a 
normative approach to reasoning [4-10], or 
by  fractionating it into sub-component processes [11-14]. 
The results often lack specificity to reasoning [15]. Most 
importantly though, these investigations provide a static 
characterization of reasoning.  
The neuroimaging literature mostly focused on short-
term and normative forms of reasoning [9,16-18]. This 
minimizes variability in reasoning episode length and 
allows segmenting reasoning episodes into separable 
chunks, but does that at the price of limitations in the 
phenomenology and ecologic value of its stimuli. 
Some  neuroimaging [19,20] and electrophysiological [21-
29] studies examined more ecological forms of reasoning, 
viz.  insight problems [30]. However, even 
electrophysiological studies, despite optimal temporal 
resolution, adopted an event-related perspective, 
concentrating on activity occurring few seconds before 
insight emergence , which only documents the outcome of 
the reasoning process, not the process itself. 
 Event-related neural activity associated with the 
solution of riddles with insight was found to be related to 
properties of preceding resting activity [26,27]. These 
studies had the remarkable merit of using spontaneous 
brain activity to characterize reasoning, but in  essence 
provided a comparative statics description. Although 
some behavioural studies treated reasoning  as a 
dynamical process [31], a comparable  neurophysiological 
characterization is still incomplete. Altogether, the 
research accomplished so far has generally not looked at 
reasoning as a dynamical process,  and produced either 
time-averaged frames or discrete maps in partial time 
cuts. 
THE PROBLEM(S) WITH REASONING 
The generalized form of reasoning considered in this 
study comes in episodes offering scant behaviourally 
salient events with no characteristic temporal length. 
Each episode is a non-reproducible instance, as reasoning 
task can be carry out in multiple ways. Brain activity 
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associated with reasoning is not event-related, and many 
neurophysiological processes interact in a wide range of 
spatial and temporal scales. 
These phenomena can all be traced back to a basic 
fact: the brain did not develop a dedicated device for 
reasoning. Hardwired partially segregated modules 
ensure that perceptuo-motor functions are carried out at 
great speed, with stereotyped duration and time-varying 
profile, and identifiable stages, largely determined by 
input statistical properties. Reasoning, on the contrary, is 
an internally-driven dynamics: processing times, stages, 
and functional brain geometry are largely unconstrained.  
Considering these extraordinary challenges, can we 
still find general reasoning properties, over and above 
specific task demands and individual differences? What 
sort of process is reasoning in its general form? Is it a 
series of simpler reasoning cycles? Can we segment it into 
stages? What are the best neural variables and tools to 
make these properties observable?  
CHARACTERIZING THE REASONING PROCESS 
Robust characterizations of reasoning should incorporate 
stylized facts, i.e. properties consistently appearing on 
different subjects and in different periods of time, and 
select analytical tools accordingly. For instance, 
perceptual response sensitivity to incoming signals, 
stability against noise, and minimal dependence on initial 
conditions favour tools capturing transient dynamics, 
which naturally reproduce these properties under 
appropriate conditions, over tools handling asymptotic 
activity, which fail to do so [32].  
Reasoning's relative instability and inefficiency 
suggest that optimal circuitry may need constant 
reconstruction and protection from interference, 
summoning protracted support of energetically costly 
long-range communications. Thus, reasoning may be a 
sort of resonant regime, where functional efficiency 
would be achieved with specific, though unstable, spatio-
temporal patterns, and should be studied with tools 
capable of extracting spatially-extended dynamic 
transients.  
REASONING DYNAMICS 
Each cognitive process can be translated in dynamical 
terms and corresponding aspects of neural activity.  
Perceptual processes are relaxational, quasi-
stereotyped short duration processes. The brain can 
prima facie be modelled as an excitable  medium: 
perturbations above a threshold induce a dynamical cycle, 
before the system reverts to its initial silent  state.  
Learning too is a relaxational process: following a 
gradient dynamics, the brain incorporates the 
environment's statistical relationships, by representing 
them in terms of its functional connectivity. Cycles can be 
of much longer duration and non-trivial shape than 
perceptual ones. The dynamics is dominated by 
fluctuations much shorter than the whole process.  
Reasoning may not be purely relaxational. The 
corresponding neural  activity is a fluctuation-dominated 
endogenously modulated spontaneous brain activity, with 
no clear gradient, and no single instant summarizing the 
entire process. The reasoning scientist's world is 
considerably more complex than the event-related short 
time scale one of perception. It is through the generic 
properties of spontaneous activity's long time scales that 
robust reasoning properties should be formulated [33]. 
THE STARTING POINT: SPONTANEOUS BRAIN ACTIVITY 
Spontaneous activity can be thought of as a data bank of 
cortical states, continuously reedited across the cortex 
[34]. This re-editing process contains rich non-random 
spatio-temporal structure [35-40].  
The building blocks of this structure are fluctuations 
which the brain, as all dissipative out-of-equilibrium 
systems, generates even for fixed control parameter 
values and in the absence of external stimuli, and which 
constitute the trademark of its functioning. The dynamics 
is intermittent, with alternating laminar and turbulent 
phases [41,42], weakly non-ergodic, i.e. some phase space 
regions take extremely long times to be visited, and 
shows aging, i.e. temporal correlations depend on the 
observation time [43]. Various aspects of spontaneous 
activity display similar properties at all temporal and 
spatial scales [44-51]. Self-similarity break-down [52,53], 
with Gaussian low-frequency and non-Gaussian high-
frequency fluctuations [54] were also reported.  
Understanding fluctuations 
We can imagine brain activity as the motion of a random 
walker, making steps of a length taken from some 
distribution, at times taken from some other distribution 
or, equivalently, of a macroscopic particle diffusing in a 
liquid, subject to viscous friction and to an additive 
random force [55].  
The relationship between these two forces' time scales 
determines how microscopic fluctuations produce 
observable macroscopic properties. In the equilibrium 
world of perceptual scientists, the brain makes steps 
taken from a Gaussian distribution  and whose 
correlations, much faster than the friction time scale, have 
no macroscopical effect. Reasoning scientists live far from 
equilibrium: random fluctuations are no faster than the 
friction term and show long-lasting correlations, which 
renormalize, becoming macroscopically detectable [56].  
Complex fluctuations reveal the particle's navigation 
'style', e.g. how travelled distances and the times to reach 
a given target scale with time [57]. They also allow 
deducing a system's characteristic temporal scales. For an 
equilibrium system with exponential temporal 
autocorrelation decay, the correlation length, i.e. the value 
  that makes the autocorrelation  =  = 0,  or the 
correlation time 	
 =  


, endow the process with a 
unique temporal scale. However, at long time scales, the 
presence of scaling indicates that the brain relaxes more 
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slowly than an exponential and fluctuates at all scales [58-
60]. Both and 	
 may diverge, and a characteristic time 
ceases to exist. Temporal scales are characterized by 
some relationship between them, which can be treated as 
a dynamical system, relating the behaviour of an observed 
variable over a series of nested scales [61,62]. 
The brain's functional and corresponding dynamical 
heterogeneity produces a spatial distribution of time 
scales. While only some of these are usually considered of 
interest, global temporal scales may not coincide with any 
of the local dynamics, and may emerge from transient 
connectivity patterns created and destroyed by rewiring 
processes [63]. Because spatial scales also have non-
trivial topological properties [64], global dynamics is a 
field endowed with arbitrarily real and phase-space 
complex topologies [65], where scales replace metric 
distances, fractal geometry the Euclidean one, and 
scale  invariance Galilean invariance.  
By resorting to nonlinear analysis, algebraic and 
differential topology, renormalization group methods etc. 
[66,67], brain activity can then be described in terms of 
universal properties, i.e. regimes with robust macroscopic 
behaviour with respect to the nature of microscopic 
interactions and sharing the same symmetries. These 
descriptions partition the phase space, identify dynamical 
pathways leading to specific regions of this space, and 
allow relating descriptions of the same brain at different 
scales, and grouping descriptions of different brains 
exhibiting the same large-scale behaviour [66].  
Chunking 
Correlated noise and cross-scale relationships produce 
temporally ordered structures which can help segmenting 
reasoning episodes into chunks. 
This can be done by defining quasi-stationary 
segments boundaries [68]. The scaling properties of 
quasi-stationary segments' durations may help clarifying 
whether reasoning in its general form is merely a 
repetition of simple cycles seen in more controlled forms 
of reasoning, or is of a qualitatively different nature, and 
in any case, determining the time scales at which simpler 
cycles are reedited.  
The waiting-time distribution between steps defines 
an internal operational time, which may grow sub- or 
super-linearly with physical time [69]. Multiplicative 
cross-scale interactions bias the waiting-time distribution 
so that operational and physical times no longer coincide, 
and local probability densities become time-dependent 
and intermittent [70].  
FROM SPONTANEOUS ACTIVITY TO REASONING 
Cognitive processes can be thought of as selections and 
orchestrations of cortical states already present in 
spontaneous activity [71,72]. Each process corresponds 
to a specific phase space cut, with its own topological 
properties and symmetries, and characteristic kinematics, 
memory, ageing properties, degree of ergodicity, and 
internal clock [33]. 
Reasoning may modulate not brain activity's 
frequency or amplitude but its functional form [33], e.g. 
by pushing it towards the basin of attraction of 
advantageous probability distributions: good reasoning 
could be tantamount to designing a driving noise function 
forcing the system’s stationary distribution to equal a 
target one.  
Cognitive demands may generally change the 
symmetries of brain activity. For instance, scaling regime 
modulations observed in associations with a reasoning 
task [73] may correspond to cross-overs between 
universality classes, reflecting dynamical transitions in 
the system’s behaviour [74].  
APPRAISING REASONING 
Brain fluctuations can be interpreted in various 
interrelated ways that help evaluating the quality of 
reasoning, by using models of the function it fulfils and 
quantifying the constraints the brain faces while 
performing it. 
Metaphors for reasoning 
Reasoning, as other cognitive processes, e.g. memory 
recall [75,76], can be represented as a search process 
similar to that of animals foraging in an unknown 
environment [77]. This search process can be 
characterized in terms of random walks [78-81]. 
Importantly, random walk types can quantify the extent to 
which a given trajectory optimizes search, given the 
characteristics of the explored space and the resources 
available to the individual [81]. Such a characterisation 
would allow assessing in a context-specific way the 
quality of both the reasoning and the 'reasoner'. That 
behavioural aspects of human cognition [75,76] and brain 
activity both show non-Gaussian, heavy-tailed 
distributions might indicate search optimality [80,82]. 
However, because these properties are generic in 
spontaneous activity, reasoning's quality can only be 
described in terms of its modulations. Furthermore, since 
local dynamics may be nowhere Lévy-like, finding the 
neural property and spatial scale showing scaling are the 
crucial steps. 
The reasoning regime could also be represented as a 
network traffic regulation problem, where phenomena 
such as overload or jamming may be quantified in terms 
of information creation, erasure and transmission rates, 
by regarding simple fluctuations as letters of an alphabet 
and fluctuation complexes as words, and quantifying the 
amount of information in the system. Characterizing 
traffic regulation may involve understanding the interplay 
between the underlying network's topology, burstiness of 
information packets and the shape of fluctuation 
distributions [83-85]. Although only causal information 
[86] may directly serve reasoning purposes, the total 
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information encoded in the network may describe the 
noise-control mechanisms indirectly optimizing it.  
The sudden onset of insight may be thought of as an 
extreme event comparable to earthquakes, financial 
crashes or epileptic seizures [87,88], e.g. as a rupture 
phenomenon, and the route to it as a long charging 
process, with nested hierarchical "earthquakes", and try 
predicting its occurrence. For such phenomena, the 
coupling strengths distribution and topology constitute 
the relevant field [89], which may be described using 
complex network theory [64]. It is tempting to conjecture 
that insight onset may be predicted by monitoring e.g. 
anomalous diffusion parameters [88], variations in 
Gaussianity [90], or changes in fractal spectrum 
complexity [91,92].  
From dynamics to thermodynamics 
Differences in reasoning abilities can produce not 
only  differences in processing times of some orders 
of  magnitude, but also qualitative ones in dynamical 
and  statistical aspects of brain fluctuations, and 
in  corresponding brain topography and topology. 
A  natural question when studying reasoning is 
then:  "How efficiently does a given brain carry 
out  reasoning?". 
There are various ways to assess efficiency of a  given 
device. If reasoning was the output of an engine,  e.g. a 
Carnot's engine, it would be natural to  understand not 
only how the engine produces it, but  also how efficiently 
it performs it.   
While functional network reconstruction can provide 
an indirect characterization of brain activity's energetic 
aspects [93,94], the brain's thermodynamics can directly 
be deduced from its dynamics [95], which can be 
interpreted as the walker's diffusion on the surface  of the 
entropy production rate in the space of kinetic variables 
[96] .  
Temperature represents a good example of how 
thermodynamical variables can be used to describe brain 
activity [97]. For a system at equilibrium, temperature is 
proportional to the ratio between the  response to an 
external field conjugate to some observable and the 
corresponding autocorrelation  function in the 
unperturbed system [98]. In the brain [99], equilibrium 
temperature must be substituted by an effective 
temperature [100] reflecting what a thermometer 
responding on the time scale at which the system reverts 
to equilibrium would measure [101]. Each scales can have 
its own effective temperature even within the same 
spatial region, corresponding to different distances from 
equilibrium and reflecting qualitatively different diffusion 
processes [102]. Thus, measuring effective temperature 
at various scales allows understanding the extent to 
which each spatio-temporal scale deviates from 
equilibrium, produces entropy, etc..  
Thermodynamic functions can be used to directly 
describe brain activity, but also as control parameters, i.e. 
one can monitor different aspects of brain activity as one 
measured thermodynamical variable varies in time. For 
instance, one may observe temperature variations 
during  a reasoning task, but also possible phase 
transitions in some other  property of neural activity, as 
temperature is varied [97].  
FROM THEORY TO EXPERIMENT 
OBSERVING REASONING 
Reasoning is a difficult phenomenon to observe: tasks can 
be executed in more than one way, each possibly 
corresponding to a neural phase space with convoluted 
geometry and the processes involved in reasoning may 
evolve over time-scales exceeding those typical of 
laboratory testing.  
Proper observation of a given process requires that 
the observation time be much larger than any scale in the 
system. A process is observable if it has a finite ratio 
between the characteristic time of the independent 
variable and the length of the available time series [103]. 
Factors including long-term memory, aging and weak 
ergodicity breaking may result in a diverging ratio [104]. 
The observation time should also be much larger than the 
time needed to visit the neural phase space. However, 
deciding whether a reasoning episode, or even an 
ensemble of episodes, sufficiently sample a subject's 
repertoire is non-trivial.  
Cognitive neuroscientists observe phenomena through 
experiments where subjects typically carry out given 
tasks a large number of times, assumed to be independent 
realizations of the same observable, and to adequately 
sample the phase space of task-related brain activity. 
However, in the presence of complex fluctuations, trials 
may not self-average, i.e. dispersion would not vanish 
even for an infinite number of trials [105].  
Furthermore, the time needed to explore this space 
may far exceed the typical reasoning episode duration, 
and reasoning episodes may explore different aspects of 
the space of available strategies. Thus, trials may improve 
phase space exploration rather than the signal-to-noise 
ratio [106].  
EXPERIMENTAL IMPLICATIONS 
Reasoning's characteristics, particularly its lack of 
characteristic temporal duration, have implications at 
various levels. First, episodes cannot be compared in an 
event-related fashion.  Second, defining reliable neural 
correlates of reasoning requires defining its characteristic 
temporal scales. Third, measures of brain activity should 
be invariant with respect to overall duration. Scaling 
exponents, data collapse and universality of fluctuations 
statistics [107-109], or explicit evolution equations for 
the particle's momenta and for the cross-scale fluctuation 
probabilities [62] can be retrieved from data and applied 
to unevenly lengthen trials. Thermodynamic quantities 
such as free energy or temperature  can also be estimated 
for stochastic trajectories over finite time durations 
[97,110-113]. In all cases, the reconstruction of the 
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underlying dynamics improves with the recording 
device's resolution.  
Reasoning presents a dilemma between ensuring 
complete phase space exploration, which may require 
extremely long trials, and signal stationarity, which is 
guaranteed only for time scales much shorter than the 
reasoning episodes' duration. At fast time scales, the 
window in which relevant quantities are calculated 
should not introduce spurious time scales, filtering out 
genuine ones. Altogether, reasoning's inherently unstable 
nature suggests that describing it may boil down to 
characterizing non-stationarities and their aetiologies. 
Reasoning tasks may be so difficult that only few 
participants manage to produce solutions within a 
reasonable time. This represents a shortcoming when 
trials are considered as independent and identically 
distributed, as the signal-to-noise ratio improves with the 
square root of the number of trials. Smoothing response 
times is a frequent strategy to obviate this problem, but 
limits or distorts the reasoning process. Furthermore, 
however many, short trials may insufficiently explore the 
phase space. Designs with few long trials may express 
richer spatiotemporal brain dynamics than many short 
ones of equivalent overall length. 
Finally, while observed scaling properties may help 
understanding whether insight is predictable, i.e. whether 
it is an outlier or it is generated by the same distribution 
producing anonymous events, predicting insight onset in 
real data appears a challenging task, as reasoning 
episodes are various orders of magnitude shorter than 
earthquake, financial or epilepsy time series [114].  
CONCLUSIONS 
Reasoning elicits an exceptionally rich repertoire of 
otherwise unexpressed neural properties. Its neural 
correlates are therefore as much helpful to 
neuroscientists, whom it compels to consider hitherto 
neglected brain properties, as they are to psychologists 
striving to understand its underlying processes. 
Defining general and robust mechanistic properties  of 
healthy and dysfunctional reasoning will require as  yet 
non-standard brain metrics, experimental designs,  and 
analytical tools (borrowed from fields rarely 
made  available to psychologists). This may shed light 
on  fundamental mechanistic properties of both 
healthy  and dysfunctional reasoning, and ultimately 
help  understanding the actions of cognitive 
and  pharmacological interventions used as 
brain  enhancers and targeting them to achieve 
desired  states [115].   
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